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Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
by Jean-Marie Baland and James A. Robinson*
Abstract: We study the connection between employment and political con-
trol. Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. For example,
when worker eort is crucial for production, but only imperfectly observed. We
show that, depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows
employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' polit-
ical behavior. We thus demonstrate that employment does not simply generate
income, it also gives power to control the behavior of others.
The analysis focuses on the salient example of political control, where landlords
coerce the votes of their workers in the absence of a secret ballot. The model we
develop generates predictions about electoral outcomes which can be tested by
investigating the impact of the introduction of an eective secret ballot. Such
an institutional reform reduces landlords' control, and in consequence, we should
observe changes in voting behavior, since workers whose votes were previously
controlled and sold can now vote freely.
We test the predictions of the model by examining in detail the eects of the
introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958. We show that, consistent with
our theory, the political reforms led to large changes in voting behavior. Before the
reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tend to exhibit
a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with
the landed oligarchy. After the reform however, this dierence across localities
completely disappeared.
JEL Classication Number: D72, O54, Q15.
Keywords: Political institutions, elections, land prices.
\It is the most cruel mockery to tell a man he may vote for A or B,
when you know that he is so much under the inuence of A, or the
friends of A, that his voting for B would be attended with the destruc-
tion of him. It is not he who has the vote, really and substantially, but
his landlord, for it is for his benet and interest that it is exercised in
the present system." David Ricardo ([1824], 1951-1973, p. 506)
In this paper we study the connection between employment and political con-
trol. Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. For example,
when worker eort is crucial for production, but only imperfectly observed. We
show that the fact that employers already concede rents to workers may allow
them, depending on the political institutions, to use the threat of withdrawing
these rents to control their political behavior. We thus demonstrate that employ-
ment does not simply generate income, it also gives power to control the behavior
of others.
The most salient example of such a connection arises in the absence of a secret
ballot. When voting is not secret, it becomes feasible to buy, sell and coerce
votes. While there are recorded instances of an individualized market for votes,
the main stylized fact which emerges from the case study literature is that rather
than individuals freely selling their votes to politicians, employers usually control
and supply the votes of their employees in exchange for money, favors or policies.
More specically, as discussed by Ricardo (1824), employers are usually landlords.
That landlords control the political activities of their workers has historically
been a pervasive characteristic of agrarian economies.1 In Britain, before the
introduction of the secret ballot in 1872, this factor was critical in determining the
outcome of rural elections. As observed by Lord Edward Stanley in 1841,\when
any man attempted to estimate the probable result of a county election in England,
it was ascertained by calculating the number of the great landed proprietors in
the county and weighing the number of occupiers under them."2 Throughout the
1As Edward E. Malefakis (1970, p. 98) summarized the situation in nineteenth century rural
Andaluca, \a man's job depended on his vote."
2Quoted in George S. R. Kitson-Clark (1951, p. 112). Frank O'Gorman (1989, p.20) estimates
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nineteenth century radicals and reformers complained about the lack of a secret
ballot in Britain (see Brian Kinzer, 1982, Gary Cox, 1987 and Norman Gash,
1977). In Germany, despite the fact that a democratic parliament was introduced
in 1848 there is a mass of evidence that rural voters were controlled by landed
interests. Bismarck even supported an extension of voting rights in 1871 because
he thought that the control exercised by landlords over rural voters would oset
the rising inuence of urban workers (Reinhard Bendix's, 1964, p. 97, Theodore
S. Hamerow 1974, pp. 299-300).
Landlords control over rural elections was greatly facilitated where balloting
was open (see Richard J. Goldstein, 1983, p. 15). However, even when there was
a supposedly secret ballot (and not open voting), strategies were found to keep
voting under control. Thus, in the German case, political parties often printed
their own ballots: \given that ballots had to be obtained from the candidates
themselves or from their agents, it was often physically impossible for a poor
man to vote for anyone but the squire's choice" (Margaret L. Anderson, 1993,
p. 1467).3 Even countries such as France, which moved early to universal male
surage (after 1848) and free elections (after 1871), only introduced an eective
(though non-Australian)4 secret ballot in 1913. Before this \the ballots frequently
had subtle but distinct marks, such as paper thickness, colour and size, from which
the election ocials could deduce a voter's decision. This information was then
passed on to notables who could easily punish such wayward voters since they
frequently were his tenants or employees" (Marcus Kreuzer 1996, p. 108).
Similar tactics were used and remain up to the present day in democratic third
world countries.5 Nowhere is the evidence about landlord control of elections so
conclusive as in Latin America. Following independence most Latin American
that by 1807 this resulted in the outcomes of 300 parliamentary seats being a foregone conclusion.
He describes in detail the system of patronage linking high politicians such as Walpole with
members of parliament, typically Whig `oligarchs,' who controlled the local electorate.
3For further evidence on the German case see David Blackbourn (1988) and the section on
Germany in Ralph Gibson and Martin Blinkhorn (1991).
4The `Australian ballot' has become synonymous with perfectly secret voting and refers to
a situation where all political alternatives are on a single government produced ballot paper. It
derives its name from the fact that the rst use of such a ballot was in Australia in 1856.
5For evidence from India see Atul Kohli (1990, pp. 227-228) and Jan Breman (1974).
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countries adopted liberal constitutions committing themselves to regular elections,
yet with few exceptions, Latin American societies did not become consolidated
democracies with free regular elections contested by all adults until the 1980's.6
In Colombia, the country which has the longest experience of formal democracy in
Latin America and where the military has played the most marginal of political
roles, the equivalent of the Australian ballot was legislated only in 1988 and
introduced rst in 1990. In Chile the control of voting by landowners was very
frankly discussed in the debate leading up to the introduction of the secret ballot
in 1958 in language strikingly similar to that used by Lord Stanley quoted above.
For example, Socialist senator Martones argued in favor of introducing the secret
ballot because, \if that law [the old electoral law without a secret ballot] did not
exist, instead of there being 9 Socialist senators there would be 18, and you [the
Conservatives] would be reduced to 2 or 3 ... [laughter] you laugh, but the truth is
that there would be not 2 Conservative senators from O'Higgins and Colchagua,
which corresponds exactly to the number of inquilinos in the fundos which belong
to the Conservative hacendados in that region. Conservatives would have only
one or perhaps none."7
We develop a model of labor contracting with moral hazard and limited liability
in the rural sector.8 Absent politics, landlords nd it optimal to concede rents
to workers to induce eort. Introducing politics, we show that the presence of
these rents allows landlords to pay less than the full opportunity cost of the votes
of their workers, and thus possibly to protably oer a contract stipulating both
6See Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokolo (2005) and Jonathan Hartlyn and Arturo
Valenzuela (1998). For Brazil see Eul-Soo Pang (1973), Richard Graham (1990) and Jose de
Souza Martins (1996).
7A \fundo" is a large farm and a \hacendado" a large landowner and an inquilino was a
permanent worker on such farms. Quoted in El Mercurio, Saturday May 19, 1958, p. 20.
8Why does electoral corruption seem to be more signicant in rural as opposed to urban areas?
Our model suggests three factors which indicate that urban votes may be more expensive to buy
and hence political corruption relatively less attractive in urban settings. First, as suggested
by Stephen A. Marglin (1973) it may be the case that rents are lower in factories and urban
environments. This means that, to induce eort, employers need to pay only a small wage
premium. Second, it may be harder to monitor voting and political activities in anonymous
urban environments. Third, workers in the cities may enjoy superior alternative employment
opportunities, which reduce the scope for political control by their employers.
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economic and political (voting) behavior.9 This feature also implies that it is
cheaper for political parties to buy votes indirectly through landlords since this
means they can avoid fully compensating workers for the value of their votes. We
study the implications of these phenomena for the functioning of factor markets.
The model we develop generates predictions about electoral outcomes which
can be tested by investigating the impact of the introduction of an eective secret
ballot. Such an institutional reform reduces landlords' control, and in conse-
quence, we should observe changes in voting behavior, since workers whose votes
were previously controlled and sold can now vote freely.
We examine these implications by considering the introduction of the secret
ballot in 1958 in Chile. We show that, before the reform, the support for right-
wing parties was substantially higher in the traditional `oligarchic' Central Valley
provinces which were characterized by long term patron-client relationships known
in Chile as the inquilinaje system (see e.g. Elisabeth Sadoulet, 1992). Moreover,
following the introduction of the secret ballot, it also fell substantially more in pre-
cisely those municipalities where inquilinos formed a larger share of the electorate.
More specically, using municipalities as our unit of observation, we estimate a
panel model with municipality xed eects over the period from 1949 to 1965
where the dependent variable is the vote share of right-wing parties. The main
independent variable is the share of inquilinos in the electorate which we inter-
act with year dummies. We show that prior to 1958, the estimated coecient
on inquilinos is positive and stable, while after 1958 it becomes negative. Most
importantly, the sum of the coecients is zero, suggesting that after the reform
there was no correlation between the presence of inquilinos and votes for right-
wing parties. We show that this result is robust to controlling for other covariates,
such as land distribution and time eects, and to using a variety of alternative
assumptions about the importance of inquilinos in the electorate.
The case study literature on the secret ballot focuses very much on coercion
and corruption and has obviously noticed the fact that systematic biases can
9Though we model political control in terms of voting, the analysis extends to other types of
political activities (such as types of protests, riots, demonstrations and other forms of collective
action). Such a model would have similar results to the one we present.
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be introduced into elections because of such phenomena (e.g., our discussion of
nineteenth century Germany above). In the Chilean case, scholars such as Brian
Loveman (1976), Timothy R. Scully (1992) or Arnold J. Bauer (1995), have noted
the signicance of the control of inquilinos for the political power of the right
before 1958, and linked the introduction of the secret ballot to the rise of social-
ism. Daniel Hellinger (1978) analyzed electoral change in the Chilean countryside
for the two presidential elections of 1958 and 1970, based on correlations from
a restricted (and biased) sample of municipalities. He points out that there is
a gradual erosion of support for the Right as manifested by a falling correlation
between the vote for the Nationalists and the proportion of inquilinos in the agri-
cultural workforce. He however fails to provide a consistent explanation for this
change in rural voting pattern. Our contribution here is to provide a microfoun-
dation for why landlords control voting behavior and provide the rst systematic
test of the impact of the 1958 reforms in Chile.
The incidence of secret balloting has been understudied by the literature on
political economy and institutions (e.g., Cox, 1997, Torsten Persson and Guido
Tabellini, 2000, 2003, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 2006). Thomas
Piketty (1999, 2000) and Eddie Dekel, Matthew O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky
(2005) developed models of how an individualized market for votes might work and
have studied the circumstances under which vote buying is socially undesirable.
Related papers by James M. Snyder (1991) and Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan
Helpman (1996) have looked at interest groups buying politicians with `campaign
contributions.' All of these theoretical papers focus on very dierent issues than
those we study. An important distinction is that these scholars, and most others
in the political economy literature, focus on the eciency of government policy.
We focus on why vote buying is linked to employment and how this inuences
factor markets. We also provide empirical evidence supporting our model. Most
closely related to our research, William Summerhill (1995) developed a simple
model of the idea that political rents accrue to landowners and tried to estimate
the impact of electoral reform on the economy using data from nineteenth century
Brazil.
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I. The Model
A. The Fundamentals
We consider a discrete time innite horizon model of the rural sector. There is
a unit mass of agents and a proportion x of rural agents have access to the capital
market and can therefore purchase land and hire workers. All rural agents have
the option to be self-employed and earn an income of w. We let m denote the
proportion of rural agents who become agricultural workers, and 1 m  x those
who remain self-employed.
There are L units of land which are owned by landowners with each owning
L=x = l units of land. There is a single numeraire consumption good which is
produced from land and labor. The technology is characterized by a standard
constant returns to scale neoclassical production function. On a farm, output of a
worker in any period is equal to ~g

l
n

where n is employment, g is the intensive
form of the production function so that g0 > 0 and g00 < 0, and ~ is a plot-specic
stochastic shock to output which is distributed independently across plots and
time and can take two values,  and 0 (by normalization) (since we focus on
stationary equilibria we do not introduce time subscripts). The probability that
 occurs in period t depends on the eort exerted by a worker in that period.10
Eort, ", takes two values, " 2 f0; eg. If " = e,  occurs with probability h, while
if " = 0,  occurs with probability l < h.
While output is perfectly observable by the landlord, the level of eort exerted
by the worker is not. This induces a moral hazard problem. We assume that
eort can never be observed so that the only possible wage contract depends on
the realization of ~.
There are also two political parties, `Left' (denoted L) and `Right' (denoted
R) competing for votes to win an election and all individuals have exogenous
preferences for one of these parties which means that they get utility from voting
for the party they prefer (as in a standard probabilistic voting model).
All agents in the rural sector have per-period utility functions which are linear
10We use a variant of a model which has become standard in the development literature, see
for example Abhijit Banerjee, Paul Gertler and Maitreesh Ghatak (2002)
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in consumption, c, eort, ", and voting decision j for j = L;R which depends
on the ideological orientation of the agent. Thus, U(c; "; j) = c   " + j is the
utility of an agent of type j if they vote for the party they prefer, otherwise it is
U(c; "; j) = c  ". All agents maximize the expected present discounted value of
utility and discount the future at rate  2 (0; 1).
Political party j, if it wins power, has per-period utility function,
Uj = W
j  Mj; j = R;L
and  Mj otherwise, where W j is the gain in utility for party j if it wins the
election and Mj represents the amount of rents (income) transferred by party j
to other agents in the society so that neither party is liquidity constrained. The
price that a party oers for the vote of an agent will in general depend on the
occupation of the agent: let pj` be the price paid by party j to a landlord, p
j
w be
the price paid by party j for the vote of a worker, and pjs be the price paid for the
vote of a self-employed agent.11 Let  be the impact of one vote in party j's favor
on party j's chances of winning the election.12 From this we can deduce that the
maximal price that party j would be prepared to pay for a vote is W j.
B. Timing of the game
The stage game has the following timing:
 The political parties non-cooperatively announce a price at which they will
purchase votes from each type of rural agent.
 The land market opens with each landlord deciding how much land to buy.
 Landowners hire workers by proposing a contract.
11Though we focus our analysis on situations where political parties directly purchase votes,
the model is consistent with other interpretations. For example, instead of buying votes, parties
may oer policies which favor landlords, or give landlords elected positions.
12In a previous version of the paper we provided microfoundations for this assumption with an
explicit model of voting under proportional representation and legislative bargaining (see David
Austen-Smith, 2000, and David P. Baron and Daniel Diermeier, 2001).
8
 Agents sell votes to the political parties.
 Workers vote and choose their eort level.
 Production takes place and the output shock ~ is observed.
 Landlords and the political parties observe voting behavior and the state of
nature.
 Rents are distributed by the political parties, wages are paid and workers
may be red and consumption takes place.
We now characterize the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
II. Electoral Corruption and Resource Allocation
For ease of exposition we rst characterize the outcome of political competition
for votes. We do so by assuming, as will be the interesting case, that landlords
control and sell the votes of their workers. In the next section we analyze the
circumstances under which this will happen in equilibrium. To keep the discussion
focused we assume that all landowners are right-wing while all other agents are
left-wing. In addition we assume that the right-wing party values winning more
than the left-wing party. This will have the implication that the right-wing party
will be prepared to pay more for votes than the left-wing party.
The political parties engage in Bertrand competition. We rst consider the
situation in which the right-wing party will always wish to outbid the left-wing
party for votes. This implies that WR  WL + L and the following prices are
oered by the parties in equilibrium,
Party R oers
8><>:
pR` = W
L   R
pRw = W
L
pRs = W
L + L
and,
Party L oers pL` = p
L
w = p
L
s = W
L
9
In this case, for any price that the left-wing party proposes for votes, the right-
wing party is always willing to outbid that oer for the three categories of rural
agents. As a result, in equilibrium, the left-wing party announces the maximal
price it is ready to pay for one vote, WL: Given this price, landlords will be
willing to sell their own votes to the right-wing party provided they can achieve
the same utility level that they could by selling their votes to the left-wing party.
This implies that the right-wing party must oer them a price at least equal to
pR` = W
L R: Landlords will also sell the votes of their workers if they are given
the same price that is oered by the left-wing party, which is then the price the
right-wing party announces. Lastly, for the self-employed agents, the right-wing
party must compensate them for not voting for their own preferred party, which
implies that he has to pay a price pRs = W
L + L to those agents.
Given these prices, all rural agents sell their votes to the right-wing party,
with right-wing landlords stipulating that their left-wing workers vote right-wing
in their employment voting contracts.
In the case where WL + L  WR > WL; then
Party R oers
8><>:
pR` = W
L   R;
pRw = W
L;
pRs = W
R;
and,
Party L oers
8><>:
pL` = W
L;
pLw = W
L;
pLs = W
R   L:
It is no longer optimal for the right-wing party to outbid the left-wing party for the
votes of the self-employed agents. Now, rather than buying the votes of all rural
agents, the right-wing party buys the votes of the landlords and their workers,
but the self-employed sell their votes to the left-wing party. Here, moving from
being self-employed to becoming a worker leads to a switch in voting behavior.
Under either scenario we have the following result.
Proposition 0.1. It is cheaper for the right-wing party to buy votes from a
landlord than to buy votes directly from the self-employed.
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This result follows immediately from the fact that in equilibrium pRw < p
R
s .
This proposition has the implication that it will never be protable for a rural
agent to become a political entrepreneur, buying votes from individuals and then
selling them to parties. For the rest of the paper we focus on the situation where
WR  WL + L, the analysis of the other parts of the parameter space follow
directly.
III. Employment and Power
We solve for the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of this game which is
best from the point of view of landlords. In general a strategy for a landlord is a
contract oer at date t which species wages as a function of ~, a voting decision
and the history of play up to t. For a worker a strategy determines an eort and
voting decision as a function of the history and the contract oered at t.
We start by describing the optimal labor-voting contract. As is standard, we
endow the landlord with all the bargaining power with respect to workers and he
can therefore make take-it-or-leave-it contract oers to his worker(s) specifying
his expected voting behavior and eort level. As there are two dimensions to the
worker's behavior, there are four possible wages, corresponding to whether output
is high or low, and whether the worker is observed voting for the specied party
or not. We assume that liability is limited so that wages must be non-negative.
To ensure maximal incentives, a landlord will optimally propose a wage, w, and
continued employment if output is high and the worker is not observed voting for
the wrong party. If output is low or the worker votes for the left-wing party, the
landlord will pay zero and re the worker. We assume that if a worker is ever red
by a landlord he is never employed again by a landlord and is thus perpetually
self-employed.
We focus here on the situation under which a worker is required by his landlord
to vote for the right-wing party. Given his voting behavior, the worker will exert
the optimal amount of eort if the following incentive compatibility condition
is satised. Let Vw(" = e) be the value to the worker if he exerts eort, while
Vw(" = 0) is the value if the worker shirks. The worker will exert eort if
Vw(" = e)  Vw(" = 0)
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First consider the value from exerting eort which is,
(1) Vw(" = e) = 
h (w + Vw(" = e)) + (1  h)
0@

w + WL + L

1  
1A  e:
Here, with probability h the realization of output is high, in which case at date
t the worker receives the wage w and is not red. In consequence the worker gets
the continuation value Vw(" = e). With probability 1   h, even though the
worker exerted eort, output is low. In this case the worker gets no wage and
is red at date t, never to be re-employed. In this case from date t + 1 on, the
worker is self-employed getting an income of w in each period and also being able
to freely sell his vote to whichever party he wishes. The utility from this latter
action is maxfpRs ; L + pLs g, i.e. the self-employed agent can sell his vote to the
right wing party and sacrice the utility benet of voting for his preferred party,
or he can sell his vote to the left and get the utility benet L. Now in equilibrium
we showed that pRs  L + pLs  WL + L and this explains the formula in (1).
We now consider the value of shirking, which is
(2) Vw(" = 0) = 
l (w + Vw(" = 0)) + (1  l)
0@

w + WL + L

1  
1A
The interpretation of (2) follows immediately from the discussion of (1), noting
that now, since the worker is shirking, he does not incur any eort cost and high
output arises with probability l. Hence, solving for the value functions, exerting
eort is optimal if
(3) w  

w + WL + L

+
(1  l)
h   l e
Next there is the participation constraint which shows that the worker prefers
accepting a contract to his outside option. This implies
(4) Vw(" = e)  w + W
L + L
1   or w 
w + WL + L + e
h
:
The two constraints are sucient to dene a contract eliciting high eort and
voting behavior that will be accepted by a worker. Indeed, if this contract is
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oered, the worker never chooses to vote against his landlord's wishes (whether
with high or low eort), as this implies with certainty his getting a zero wage
and being red. This yields a utility to the worker that lies below his reservation
utility, so that, ex ante, the worker is better o not accepting this contract. As
a result, accepting the contract but voting freely is never chosen in equilibrium.
Therefore, the only relevant constraints to the landlord's problem are (3) and (4).
Note also that, to be optimal from the landlord's point of view, the contract must
be such that one of these two constraints holds with equality.
We now explicitly dene the labour rents that are attributable to the existence
of a moral hazard problem in production. To do this, we consider the wage rate
that would be oered by the landlord in a contract that stipulates the eort
level, but not the voting behavior. In this contract, the eciency wage under the
incentive compatibility constraint would be
(5) ~w = w +
(1  l)
h   l e:
We consider the situation under which, with this contract, the participation con-
straint is satised, that is:
(6) ~w  w + e
h
:
Moreover, to simplify the exposition, we assume that it is optimal to propose this
contract which induces high eort by paying an eciency wage even if it concedes
rents to workers. We dene r as the per period excess in expected utility compared
to the reservation utility, that is the per period labour rent under the incentive
contract:
r = h ~w   e  w =
 
l
h   l e  w
!
(1  h);
by using equation (5). As can be inferred from condition (6), the participation
constraint is satised if and only if r > 0 under the eciency wage.
We need one more assumption before stating our main result.
Assumption 1: WL > hL=(1  h).
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Assumption 1, which comes from WL > h(WL+L), says that the value
of a vote to the landlord must be large, relative to the ideological bias of the
worker.
Proposition 0.2. It is optimal for the landlord to also control the political be-
havior of his worker if and only if r > L:
Proof: First note that if the wage had to be increased by the full disutility
of voting behavior being controlled, namely WL + L; then it could never be
protable for the landlord to oer a contract which controlled voting. This is
because expected output would be the same but a vote can only be sold for WL.
The wage that has to be paid to deter cheating when the landlord decides to also
control voting behavior must satisfy (3). Using (5), we can write:
(7) w   ~w  (WL + L)
This wage has also to satisfy the participation constraint (4) and, using (6), we
obtain:
(8) w   ~w  W
L + L
h
  r
h
Given that the contract must be optimal, one of those two conditions holds with
equality.n First consider the case where (7) holds with equality. Paying this wage
is then protable for the landlord if the expected increase in the wage is less than
the benet from controlling a vote WL, i.e.:
WL  h(w   ~w) = h(WL + L)
which holds by assumption. Consider the situation such that the participation
constraint is binding, so that (8) holds with equality. Paying this wage is protable
to the landlord if :
WL  h(w   ~w) = WL + L   r;
which holds if and only if r > L:
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Intuitively, the simple fact that the labor market is plagued by moral hazard
and that liability is limited implies that the landlord must concede rents to his
workers. This occurs even though he is in a position to make take-it or leave-it
oers to the latter. As long as the rents exceed the ideological bias, the increase in
wages landlords must concede to their workers in order to also control their voting
behaviour is lower than the price they receive for these votes from the parties.13
It is interesting to observe that if workers are unideological, so that L = 0, as
long as the political parties attach a positive value to votes and there are rents,
Proposition 2 follows without any other assumptions. Note, however, in this case,
equilibrium the price paid by the right-wing party for the vote of any rural agent
is identical and therefore it is no longer true that it is strictly cheaper to buy
votes through landlords. In contrast, the main result is sensitive to changes in the
timing of the game. For instance, if voting occurs after output is observed, the
landlord gets income from selling the vote with probability h rather than with
probability 1. Nevertheless, as long as the market for votes predates the actions
taken by the worker, the above argument goes through with only a few changes in
details. However, if the worker can sell his vote after observing the output shock,
then to control votes landlords have to raise the wage by WL+L which cannot
be protable.
We now have to consider whether it is optimal for landlords to pay the eciency
wage w which satises both (3) and (4) with at least one equality. To understand
this we rst consider the optimal demand for labor in a farm of size l with n
workers. Prots are,
(9) hg
 
l
n
!
n  hwn+ WLn
The rst term in (9) is expected revenues, the second the expected wage bill, and
the third the political rents that the landlord gets from selling the votes of his n
workers at the price WL. The optimal demand for labor is determined by the
13The surplus thus given to the workers also yields a comparative advantage to the employer
in other spheres, such as the credit market. This argument has been used in part of the literature
on interlinked contracts.
15
rst-order condition,
(10) 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hw + WL = 0
The equation (10) implicitly denes the optimal demand for labor as a function
of parameters, which we write n(l; WL; w).
It is always protable for the landlord to pay this eciency wage contract if
(11)

h   l

g
 
l
n(l; WL; w)
!
+ WL  hw   w
We therefore assume that the expected increase in prot from workers exerting
eort, evaluated at the eciency wage, plus the rents from selling their votes must
be greater than the expected increase in the wage bill.
The model has interesting implications for the price of land, denoted : In the
model landlords hold land while workers have no access to capital markets and
cannot purchase land. Nevertheless, landlords could buy land from each other.
The equilibrium price of a plot of land must now adjust so that prots are zero
or,
(12)
 
hg
 
l
n(l; WL; w)
!
  hw + WL
!
n(l; WL; w)
l
= 
Equation (12) implies the following result.
Proposition 0.3. In equilibrium the price of land incorporates political rents.
Acquiring land is desirable not only for productive purposes, but also for the
political rents attached to the political control of the workforce employed on it.
Equilibrium prices on the land market reect this mechanism.
It follows from Proposition 2 that a political reform which stops landlords
controlling the political behavior of their workers, such as the introduction of an
eective secret ballot, removes the ability of landlords to sell their votes and has
interesting comparative static eects.
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Proposition 0.4. The introduction of a secret ballot leads to a fall in the price
of land and the vote share of the right-wing party.
If all agents had access to capital markets then there would be no land con-
centration and all land would be farmed by smallholders with no workers getting
rents. The fact that, with perfect capital markets, smallholders are always willing
to outbid landowners for land follows from the fact that, through the participa-
tion constraint, the economic rents that landlords transfer to workers exceed the
political rents they receive from parties. Therefore, even though it is still true
that the ability of landlords to sell votes increases their demand for land, land is
still more valuable to smallholders.14
The interaction of the market failures is crucial. Without moral hazard there
are no rents and even with imperfect capital markets electoral corruption would
not aect the price of land, as workers would then have to be fully compensated
for the control of their votes. At the same time, with moral hazard but no capital
market imperfections there is no ineciency either.
We now proceed to develop an empirical test of part of Proposition 3. In
particular, we focus on the impact of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile
in 1958 on the vote share of right-wing parties. In a companion paper, Jean-
Marie Baland and James A. Robinson (2007), we investigate the impact of the
same reform on the price of land.
IV. The political impact of the 1958 electoral reform in Chile: an
overview
Like most Latin American countries, upon gaining independence from Spain,
Chile adopted republican institutions. These became institutionalized in the 19th
century and elections determined presidential succession without military or other
intervention. Universal literate male surage was introduced in 1874 but voting
was not secret. Interestingly, the 1874 surage extension in Chile was opposed by
14The ineciency here stemming from imperfections in the capital market is related to the
results of Abhijit Banerjee and Andrew Newman (1993), Patrick Legros and Andrew Newman
(1996), Dilip Mookherjee (1997) and Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002)
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some more progressive Chileans as they \fully realized that in a predominantly
rural society with traditional landlord-peasant ties, the Conservatives would over-
whelm their opponents at the polls." (J. Samuel Valenzuela, 1985, see also Bauer,
1995, p. 30). The nineteenth century democracy collapsed in 1924 and the fol-
lowing period saw ve military coups before democracy was restored in 1932. The
intervening period was dominated by Colonel Carlos Iba~nez. After 1932 demo-
cratic stability was based on an explicit compromise between the growing power
of urban groups and the power of the traditional landed elites. 15
A. Mechanisms of Control of Rural Votes
\Throughout the history of the Republic, the political inuence of the rural
sector in Chile was disproportionately greater than its size relative to the ur-
ban sector. Congressional representation was heavily weighted in favor of rural
districts where the peasantry historically formed a pliable and controllable mass
base for conservative and reactionary groups" (Hellinger, 1978, p. 272). Landlords
systematically controlled rural voting until the late 1950s. There is a consensus
amongst historians, political scientists and sociologists about how this system
functioned (see Robert E. Kaufman, 1972, Bauer, 1975, Loveman, 1976, James
Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, 1968, and Scully, 1992, ch. 4): \There was an absolute
control of peasants by their patrones, and elections in rural communes depended
on the political preferences of the landowners" (Rene Carvacho Millar, 1981, p.
172). Large landlords usually registered all their employees, by teaching them
how to sign their names (as literacy was a condition for vote registration). The
day of the election, the employer would go vote with all their employees. \This
type of control is pervasive ... The situation was publicly accepted, and it was
even used as an argument in electoral legal complaints, particularly in order to
show that any result against the preferences of the latifundistas was fraudulent,
or to justify an unanimous electoral result in a rural locality" (Millar, 1981, p.
173). Part of the political pact which developed after the 1930s also involved the
15The Chilean pact is discussed in more detail in Arturo Valenzuela (1978), Ruth Berins
Collier and David Collier (1991, pp. 565-73) and Scully (1992, pp. 108-109).
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banning of agricultural unions, a policy which allowed severe labor repression to
be carried on in the countryside, often backed by the police (Bauer, 1995, p.32).
In line with our model, the control of rural votes by landlords was made
possible by the relatively good working conditions of the inquilinos compared
to the possible alternatives: \They were free ... but they had no defence in the
face of expulsion; indeed, the threat of being cast out into the subproletariat of
migratory workers was the most powerful weapon at the landowner's disposal.
Most inquilinos families undoubtedly judged their welfare on the estate superior
to life outside or in the nitrate elds of the northern desert." (Bauer, 1995, p. 28).
The patron-client relationship was very developed (see in particular Bauer, 1995).
Thus, \anyone seen visiting the home of a resident laborer would be immediately
approached and questioned by the owner, who reserved the right to expel him
from the property" (Jeanine Swift, 1971, p. 37).
B. The political equilibrium in the 1950s
By the 1950s the political landscape in Chile was dominated by several main
parties. There were the traditional nineteenth century parties, the Conservatives,
Liberals and Radicals. The Conservatives and Liberals were furthest to the right
and united in most things except in their attitudes to the Church (the Conserva-
tives were closely associated with the Catholic Church). The Radicals were more
towards the center politically and were strongly anti-clerical. Also in the center,
though small in the 1950s, were the Christian Democrats. To the left were the So-
cialists and then the Communists (the latter were ocially banned between 1948
and 1958 though they competed under dierent names). The landed oligarchy
provided the traditional constituency of the two right-wing parties, the Conser-
vative and the Liberal (see, e.g., Frederico G. Gil, 1966 and Steven W. Sinding,
1972). The existing party system was shocked however by the return from ex-
ile of the former dictator Carlos Iba~nez as a populist presidential candidate in
1952. Iba~nez formed a very heterogenous coalition of mostly leftist groups and
capitalized on the general disillusionment with the traditional parties.
Chilean electoral institutions in this period were based upon the D'Hondt sys-
tem of proportional representation for all elections, under the 1925 Constitution
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(for more details, see Gil, 1966, Chapter 5, and Raul Morodo, 1968). The con-
stituencies broadly coincided with the boundaries of Chile's provinces. Deputies
were elected for four year terms, senators for eight with half of the Senate being
replaced every four years. Prior to the reforms of 1958, parties issued their own
ballot papers and a closed list system was used. Thus to vote for the Socialist
party, a voter had to request the Socialist ballot which made it relatively easy to
determine his voting behavior.16 Until 1951 only literate males over the age of
twenty-one could vote; of those eligible to vote, approximately 50 percent usually
registered, and the vast majority of those registered cast ballots. Women were
allowed to exercise the franchise in installments, rst for municipal elections in
1935, then for congressional contests in 1951, and nally for presidential races in
1952.17
C. The introduction of the secret ballot in 1958
There were several important electoral reforms undertaken in Chile in the late
1950s and early 1960s. The most important was Law 12.889 promulgated on May
31st 1958, amending the basic electoral law of 1925 (see Jose Luis Castro, 1941,
p. 35 and Ricardo Cruz Coke, 1984, pp. 27-29 for a discussion of this law) and
its most important aspect was the introduction of the cedula unica (the unied
ballot). After 1958, the voter received a single, ocial ballot, which contained
all party slates for any single type of election in his district and an open list
system was adopted so that voters did not have to respect any ocial ordering of
candidates. Another important law of 1958 banned electoral pacts between parties
for deputies and councilmen (a 1962 electoral law extended this prohibition to
senatorial elections).
The introduction of the secret ballot had an immediate impact on the balance
of political power in Chile. Loveman (1976, p. 219) notes, \The introduction
of a public ballot meant that landowners could no longer eectively control the
16Loveman (2001, pp. 222-3) provides a detailed discussion of how party provision of ballots
before 1958 facilitated electoral corruption.
17Note that registration and vote turn-out are very close in Chile, since once an individual
registers, voting is mandatory.
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votes of rural labor. The electoral hegemony of the Right in the countryside thus
gave way to forces that advocated social change in the rural areas ... In 1958 the
performance of the FRAP (Socialists and Communists) in rural districts left little
doubt that landowners' control over rural votes had considerably declined."
If the lack of secret balloting had played an important role in guaranteeing
democratic stability in Chile since the 1930s, why was the secret ballot introduced
in 1958? Though this issue appears not to have been researched by political
scientists, the most plausible reason for this is a deliberate attempt to disrupt the
existing political equilibrium. As we noted above, the election of Iba~nez in 1952
was based on a heterogenous coalition and an `anti-politics' platform.18 Iba~nez
intended to forge a new political movement and though he failed in this, it seems
likely that the introduction of the secret ballot, with its easily anticipated eects
on voting in the countryside, was a calculated gamble. It may also have been part
of a deal which he made with some of his key supporters, the Agrarian Labor party
(Agrario Laboristas) and the Popular Socialist party (Partido Socialista Popular)
both of which would have had an interest in mobilizing rural voters.
Interestingly however, despite these changes, the Conservative Jorge Alessan-
dri won the presidential election in 1958, principally on a platform emphasiz-
ing conservative monetary policies which were a response to the populism of the
Iba~nez regime.19 Under Iba~nez per-capita GDP had fallen by 2 percent and ina-
tion had averaged 45 percent, peaking at an annual rate of 76 percent in 1955 (see
Ffrench-Davis, 1973, p. 242 and Table 35). However, the right began to disinte-
grate during the 1960s with the rise of the centrist Christian Democratic Party
(Partido Democrata Cristiano{PDC), founded in 1957 with the merger of three
conservative elements: the National Falange, founded in 1938; the Social Chris-
tian Conservative Party; and the remnants of the Agrarian Labor Party that had
backed Iba~nez. In the 1960s, the Christian Democrats became more progressive,
and espoused reformist Catholic doctrines, which appealed strongly to the middle
18His campaign was based on the symbol of a "broom" with which he promised to "sweep"
away political corruption and bad governments...
19Though he polled only 33,416 votes (out of 1,235,552 cast) more than Salvador Allende,
the candidate for the Socialist and Communist alliance. Antonio Zamorano, a leftist defrocked
priest, deprived Allende of a victory by gaining 41,304 (3.3%) left-wing votes.
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class, women and rural voters. In 1966 the Conservatives and Liberals merged
to form the National Party. The Christian Democrat candidate, Eduardo Frei,
won the presidency in 1964, and in 1970 the Christian Democrats provided sup-
port to Allende, in exchange of his guaranteeing strict adherence to democratic
procedures.
D. Agrarian relations and electoral results across provinces
We collected data from the 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961 and 1965 electoral registries,
the agricultural census of 1935, 1955 and 1965 (see the Appendix) and the popu-
lation censuses of 1930, 1940, 1952, 1960 and 1970. The data were collected at the
communa (municipality) level, which corresponds to the lowest level of electoral
district as well as the smallest administrative unit. As census units do not always
strictly match the electoral districts, and changed denition over time, we had to
exclude all the communas for which we could not be certain of the correspondence,
which left us with a sample of 246 communas (out of 295). The variables used
throughout the analysis are described in the Appendix (table A1).
Our main results are mostly based on the 1957 and the 1965 parliamentary (all
of the congress and half of the senate) elections, as they allows a direct comparison
of the consequences of the introduction of the secret ballot in 1958, but also
because those two election years are the closest to the corresponding agricultural
census data (1955 and 1965) from which we have information on the occupational
division of the population at the level of the municipality. We describe in Table
1 the main trends at the level of the provinces. In the table, we report the
information over the three Central Valley regions, its two neighboring regions, the
Frontier and the Little North, and the other regions.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The relationship between agrarian relations and electoral outcomes is striking.
In 1957, the landed oligarchy in Chile dominated the Urban and the North Central
Valley provinces: the proportion of inquilinos in the number of registered voters
in 1957 is 18.9 percent in the North Central Valley, and 17.2 in the Urban Central
Valley, but 11.2 in the Frontier and Little North, and 8.2 in the other provinces.
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Unsurprisingly, the share of right-wing votes in 1957 in the North Central Valley
was 50.0 percent, and 40.8 percent in the Urban Central Valley, much higher than
in the other provinces.20
After 1958, the fall in the right-wing votes occurs in provinces with a larger
proportion of inquilinos per worker (across provinces, the correlation coecient
between the two is equal to -0.67). The fall in right-wing votes is dramatic in
the Central Valley provinces. Even the absolute number of right-wing votes fell in
those areas, in spite of an increase in registered voters. The fall is very pronounced
in some provinces, such as Colchagua (-48.1 percent) from an absolute majority
of 70.2 percent of the votes in 1957 to barely 22.5 percent in 1965.
V. The political impact of the 1958 electoral reform: a test
A. The empirical strategy
The empirical strategy pursued in this paper can be described as follows. Be-
fore the 1958 reform, the share of right-wing votes should be higher in communas
with more inquilinos since their votes are then controlled. However, after the re-
form, the inuence of inquilinos on electoral results should disappear, so that the
dierence in voting patterns across the two types of communas should disappear.
In table 2 below, we report the electoral results in 1957 and 1965 for communas
with less and more inquilinos than the median.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Over the period, right-wing votes in communas with less inquilinos fell by -
16.2 percent while it fell by -30.3 percent in communas with more inquilinos. The
impact of the loss of control over inquilinos votes on the fall in right-wing votes
corresponds to the dierence between these two gures, -14.1 percent. The model
below aims at estimating this impact more precisely.
In Figure 1, we present simple OLS scatter plot of the relationship between
right-wing votes and the proportion of inquilinos in each communa. The pattern is
20The relationship between right-wing votes in the 1957 elections and land concentration is
less clear however. This is due to the fact that in the arid, semi-arid and infertile provinces to
the north and to the south of the Central Valley (including the Frontier), land concentration
tends also to be high, as a result of the technological constraints on agriculture in these provinces
(ranching instead of farming).
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striking, as the impact of inquilinos on right-wing votes is signicantly diminished
after 1958.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
B. The empirical models
Two major limitations constrain our empirical strategy: rst, we do not have
information on voters by occupation category in a municipality. In other words, we
do not know the number of inquilinos or other agricultural workers who actually
voted in a particular municipality in a particular election. For each municipality,
we know the total number of inquilinos (and of other agricultural workers), and
we know the total number of valid votes in a particular election. We therefore
have to assume a specic relationship between the distribution of the population
across occupations and the distribution of voters across occupations in a particular
municipality. Moreover, as we already noted above, the occupational division of
a municipality's population is available only through the agricultural censuses,
which were administered in 1935, 1955 and 1965. This explains our emphasis
on the 1957 and 1965 elections, even though we will also provide results for all
congressional elections between 1949 and 1965.21
We rst present the models underlying our empirical analysis. We let RVi;t
represent the number of votes cast in favor of the right-wing party, Vi;t, the total
number of voters, and V hi;t, the total number of voters of type h at time t in
communa i. Voters can be of three dierent types: h = inq if the voter is an
inquilino, h = agr if the voter is not an inquilino but works in agriculture, and
h = na if he is not an agricultural worker. We can then write:
(13) RVi;t = (i+I;t+
inq
t )V
inq
i;t +(i+I;t+
agr
t )V
agr
i;t +(i+I;t+
na
t )V
na
i;t +"i;tVi;t
where i is a communa specic xed eect, which represents the time-invariant
propensity to vote for the right-wing party in that communa, I;t is a provincial
level xed eect at each time period which represents the propensity to vote
21We decided not to investigate elections before 1949 as women were enfranchised only in
1948.
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for the right-wing party in province I at time t; and ht represents the specic
propensity for a voter of type h to vote for the right-wing party at time t. The
error component, "i;t, satises the usual conditions. Rearranging equation (13)
above, and using the fact that Vi;t = V
inq
i;t + V
agr
i;t + V
na
i;t ; we obtain:
RVi;t = (I;t + 
na
t )Vi;t + (
inq
t   nat )V inqi;t + (agrt   nat )V agri;t + (i + "i;t)Vi;t:
Dividing both sides of the equation by Vi;t, one gets:
(14)
RVi;t
Vi;t
= I;t + 
na
t + (
inq
t   nat )
V inqi;t
Vi;t
+ (agrt   nat )
V agri;t
Vi;t
+ i + "i;t;
that can potentially be directly estimated. However, we do not have information
on the number of voters per category of occupation, V hi;t. Moreover, even between
1957 and 1965, the number of registered voters in the population varied.
To address these two issues we have to make assumptions in order to determine
the proportion of voters per occupation. In Model 1, we assume that:
(1) the number of voters per occupation increased at the same rate for all occu-
pations in a given communa: (Vi;t Vi;t0)=(Vi;t0) is common across all occupations
in communa i;
(2) at time t0, the probability that an inquilino is registered as an elec-
tor, (V inqt0 )=(N
inq
t0 ); is the same across all communas (but can be greater than
(V agrt0 )=(N
agr
t0 )), where N
inq
i;t represent the number of inquilinos in communa i at
time t .
Note that assumption (1) does not require the growth of voters to be iden-
tical across communas: (Vi;t)=(Vi;t0) is specic to communa i. Assumption (2)
is needed to identify the impact of the prevalence of inquilinos in the electorate:
if the proportion of inquilinos voting in 1957 is arbitrary, identication becomes
impossible as the impact of the electoral reform on the 1965 electoral results can
always be explained by dierences in the registration rates of inquilinos in 1957
across communas. We have:
V inqi;t
N inqi;t
=
Vi;t
Vi;t0
V inqt0
N inqt0
, V
inq
i;t
Vi;t
=
 
V inqt0
N inqt0
!
N inqi;t
Vi;t0
:
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We make a similar assumption for the other agricultural workers (though our
main tests do not require this), where Nagri;t represents the number of agricultural
workers (other than inquilinos) in communa i at time t:
V agri;t
Vi;t
=
V agrt0
Nagrt0
Nagri;t
Vi;t0
:
Using these two expressions in equation (14), and rearranging terms, we obtain:
(15)
RVi;t
Vi;t
= I;t+
na
t +
 
( inqt   nat )
V inqt0
N inqt0
!
N inqi;t
Vi;t0
+
 
(agrt   nat )
V agrt0
Nagrt0
!
Nagri;t
Vi;t0
+i+"i;t;
which represents the basic equation to be estimated. For further interpretation, it
is convenient to rewrite the latter by considering only two time periods, 1957 and
1965, as well as by introducing explicitly provincial dummies, DI , (which is equal
to 1 if communa i belongs to province I and zero otherwise) and a time dummy
t65 corresponding to year 1965. We then have:
(16)
RVi;t
Vi;t
=
 
i +
X
I
IDI + 
na
!
+
X
I
IDIt65 +
nat65
+
N inqi;t
Vi;57
+
N inqi;t
Vi;57
t65 + 
Nagri;t
Vi;57
+
Nagri;t
Vi;57
t65 + "i;t;
where i +
P
I IDI + 
na; represents the (total) communa xed eect. I =
I;1965   I;1957 represents time-varying provincial xed eects, in order to reect
possibly changing state policies that aect provinces dierently (for instance, be-
tween cattle-raising and grain-growing areas).  = ( inq1957   na1957)(V inq1957)=(N inq1957)
represents the propensity in 1957 of inquilinos to support right-wing parties more
than other voters, and particularly more than the other agricultural workers: we
expect  > 0 and  > . Similarly,  =
h
( inq1965   na1965)  ( inq1957   na1957)
i
(V inq1957)=(N
inq
1957)
represents the change in the inquilinos' voting behaviour that followed the intro-
duction of the secret ballot. After the electoral reform, inquilinos can vote freely
and we therefore expect  < 0: We also expect inquilinos in 1965 to vote like
the other agricultural workers, so that  +  =  +  (and = 0 if we believe
that they do not vote dierently than the non-agricultural social classes):
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Model 2 assumes that, across all communas and across time, the proportion
of voting inquilinos in the inquilino population remains constant:
V inqi;t
N inqi;t
=
V inqt0
N inqt0
, V
inq
i;t
Vi;t
=
 
V inqt0
N inqt0
!
N inqi;t
Vi;t
This assumption implies that the increase in the proportion of registered voters
between 1957 and 1965 took place exclusively among non-inquilinos. Under this
assumption, we neglect the potential dierence in voting behavior between the two
other classes, the explicit incorporation of which requires additional assumptions
to determine which classes benetted most from the increase in registration. (In
eect, we therefore assume that the other agricultural workers do not vote dier-
ently from the other non-agricultural classes.) Note that we still assume that, at
time t0, the probability that an inquilino is registered as an elector, (V
inq
t0 )=(N
inq
t0 );
is not communa-specic.
The number of registered voters changed over the years. Model 1 assumes that,
within a communa, the increase in registration is identical across all social classes,
which can bias our estimates if non-inquilinos are more likely to be registered in
1965 than in 1957. In this case the 1965 eect we are capturing may simply be the
eect of an increase in registration that is biased against inquilinos.22 Model 2 is
based on the opposite assumption where the increases in registration rates entirely
took place among non-inquilinos. One can instead assume that, given the propor-
tion of inquilinos in a municipality, registration rates are themselves endogenous.
To x ideas, consider a very simple model where (i) right-wing votes depend
on the number of voting inquilinos (before 1958) (RVi;t)=(Vi;t) = f

V inqi;t =Vi;t

,
and (ii) the proportion of inquilinos in the voting population is a function of the
number of inquilinos in the population: (V inqi;t )=(Vi;t) = g

N inqi;t =Ni;t

where Ni;t
represents the total population in communa i at time t. If we use a model where
the proportion of right wing votes is a function of the proportion of inquilinos in
the population, we actually estimate the linearized reduced form of the structural
22Note however that what this argument points out is that the eect of the electoral reforms
on the 1965 elections may be over-estimated. But it leaves unbiased the coecients associated
with the inquilinos before the reform.
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model composed of the two equations above. We therefore estimate the impact
of inquilinos' presence on right-wing votes through the combined eect of their
higher propensity to be registered and their higher propensity to vote for the right-
wing parties before 1958. These two eects disappear in 1965 as inquilinos vote
freely and registration rates need not be biased in their favor with the introduction
of the secret ballot. Model 3 is given by equation (16) where (N inqi;t )=(Vi;57) and
(Nagri;t )=(Vi;57) are replaced by (N
inq
i;t )=(Ni;t) and (N
agr
i;t )=(Ni;t) respectively.
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It can be argued that, within a communa, the number of inquilinos is itself
endogenous. In model 4, we explore this issue by reestimating model 3 using the
proportion of inquilinos in the population of a municipality that prevailed in 1935.
Such a measure is less susceptible to possible endogeneity biases since it predates
the elections under study.
In models 5 and 6, we further explore the robustness of our estimates by
using alternative measures of the proportion of voting inquilinos in the voting
population. As in models 1 and 2, we assume that registration rates per occupation
are not specic to a particular municipality. Model 5 requires that the proportion
of voting inquilinos in the voting population is constant across time:
V inqi;t
Vi;t
=
V inqi;t0
Vi;t0
=
V inqt0
N inqt0
N inqi;t0
Vi;t0
;
V agri;t
Vi;t
=
V agri;t0
Vi;t0
=
V agrt0
Nagrt0
Nagri;t0
Vi;t0
:
This model still allows inquilinos to be over-represented in 1957, but implies that
the increase in registration rates that occurred between 1957 and 1965 took place
entirely among the other occupations. In model 6, the number of voting inquilinos
remains constant:
V inqi;t
Vi;t
=
V inqi;t0
Vi;t
=
V inqt0
N inqt0
N inqi;t0
Vi;t
:
This implies that all increases in the number of registered voters took place among
non-inquilinos. (An extreme version of this model assumes that, in 1957, all in-
23It is possible to re-interpret the coecients estimated by Models 3 and 4 as a direct measure
of voting behaviour, along the lines of equation (5.6). To this end, we have to assume that
the registration rate of an occupation is proportional to its share in the population of the
municipality: Registration rates are communa specic, however. We then have: (V inqi;t )=(Vi;t) =
(N inqi;t )=(Ni;t); (V
agr
i;t )=(Vi;t) = (N
agr
i;t )=(Ni;t):
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quilinos were registered, (V inqt0 )=(N
inq
t0 ) = 1, with the same specication as above.)
Model 5 and 6 are both based on more extreme assumptions on the evolution of
registration rates among inquilinos and, in the following, we use them essentially
as robustness checks.
The most relevant models for our analysis are Models 1 and 2, as they allow
us to identify changes in voting behaviour across occupations. Models 3 and 4 are
more exible as they do not require specic assumptions about the registration
process, but provide reduced form estimates which capture both the change in vot-
ing behaviour as well as the indirect eect working through changes in registration
per occupation.
C. The basic results
The information we have on inquilinos, total population, and the agricultural
labor force in a municipality comes from the two agricultural censuses of 1955 and
1965. For the elections of 1965, we used the information from the 1965 census,
while for the elections of 1957, we computed the corresponding gures, using linear
interpolation between 1955 and 1965.24
The results of the panel estimations are given in Table 3 below. Column (1)
of Model 1 corresponds to equation (16) above, with a communa xed eect but
without the province*year dummies. We therefore impose that the evolution of the
votes are the same across provinces (controlling for inquilinos), thereby assuming
that: I = 0; 8I:
In column (2), we also include provincial eects interacted with time. This
partly aects the signicance of some of our estimates, because of the provincial
pattern in the prevalence of the inquilino system.25 We also add the following
additional controls: total population and the proportion of land under large farms
in the municipality. Column (3) presents the same specication as in column (1),
but using pooled OLS with a province xed eect.
24Estimations made using the 1955 data on inquilinos instead of the 1957 data obtained by
interpolation yield almost identical results.
25As can be expected, the estimation results tend to be stronger in the absence of communa
xed eects (using pooled OLS) or in the absence of province*time dummies.
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The results obtained with Model 2 is given in columns (4) and (5), with similar
specications as in columns (1) and (2). The corresponding estimates derived from
Models 3, 4, 5 and 6 are given in columns (6)-(14).
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The results are striking, as they strongly support the hypotheses outlined
above. First, communas with more inquilinos display a stronger support in favor
of right-wing parties in 1957. Thus, from column (1), a communa in 1957 where the
share of inquilinos in the number of voters is greater by one standard deviation
(0.14) exhibits a 6.1percent higher share of votes for right-wing parties. This
represents a 15 percent increase in the average proportion of right-wing votes.
It is worth noting that the coecient estimated for inquilinos in 1957 diers
signicantly from that estimated for the other agricultural workers, conrming
our hypothesis that the voting behaviors of the two classes are completely distinct
(and in many cases,  > 0 and  < 0).
Moreover, the political distinctiveness of inquilinos disappears by 1965. The
coecient estimated, ; is negative, very signicant and of a similar magnitude
to  in absolute value:  +  does not dier from  + ; the corresponding
coecients for the other agricultural workers, nor from 0 which corresponds to
the voting behavior of the non-agricultural classes. The imposition of secret ballot
therefore had an important and signicant eect, as the correlation between the
presence of inquilinos and right-wing votes vanishes in the 1965 elections.26
The results are consistent and remarkably stable across the alternative speci-
cations even in Model 4 where we used the proportion of inquilinos in the pop-
ulation of a municipality in 1935.27 The main coecients of interest always have
the anticipated sign and comparable signicance across all regressions. They are
26Although not reported here, the provincial dummies attached to the `oligarchic' provinces
of O'Higgins, Aconcagua and Colchagua are always signicant for the 1965 elections (equal to
-0.16, -0.19 and -0.26 respectively, all signicant at the 1% level). (While we cannot estimate the
provincial xed eect for 1957 with the panel regressions, the corresponding estimates obtained
with the pooled OLS for 1957 are 0.15, 0.27 and 0.33, all signicant at the 1% level).
27With a municipality xed eect, we cannot estimate the coecients attached to variables
which remain constant over time, in particular the ones related to the 1957 elections. They are
estimated using pooled OLS in column (8).
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slightly weaker in Model 6, which is however based on the least plausible identi-
cation assumptions.
To further test the robustness of the above results, we ran similar regressions
using other indicators of the strength of patron-client relationships and of political
control by a traditional landed oligarchy. Instead of using the proportion of voters
of dierent types in the voting population, we used the proportion of inquilinos in
the agricultural labour force in 1957 and 1965 as a measure of the intensity of the
patron-client relationships in the communa, and a measure of land concentration,
the share of area owned by farms larger than 200 hectares in the total agricultural
area of the communa.28 We report the results of these estimations in table 4
below. The estimates are again consistent with our main hypotheses, though
they are less precise than in the basic model. This can be partly attributed to
the multicollinearity between the provincial dummies interacted with time and
changes in the proportion of inquilinos or in land concentration, but also to the
less precise nature of the indicators used. Interestingly, when we run a regression
using both the proportion of inquilinos and the measure of land concentration
as in column (17), the latter looses all signicance, contrary to the former. This
suggests that land concentration had less implications for the political outcome
of a municipality than the intensity of the patron-client relationship, which is
perfectly consistent with our model.29
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
The above estimates excluded the 1949, 1953 and 1961 elections. The major
problem comes from the fact that the number of inquilinos per municipality were
observed only in the three census years, 1935, 1955 and 1965. We cannot therefore
estimate Models 1, 2 and 3 as they need a time-varying measure of population
per occupation. We focus instead on Models 4, 5 and 6. Model 4 uses the number
28Again the 1957 gures were obtained by linear interpolation between 1955 and 1965. These
land concentration measures are imprecise however, as the censuses only report at the communa
level the number of farms per size category. By taking the median of each size class, we computed
an estimate of the areas, that we used to compute the shares in area.
29Note that large farms were also found in cattle-raising areas in the North and in the South
of Chile, where few inquilinos were found. The correlation between land concentration and the
proportion of inquilinos in the agricultural labour force is only 0.22.
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of inquilinos in the population in 1935 and we also propose a variant using the
number of inquilinos in the population in 1957. Model 5 uses the number of
inquilinos in 1957 (obtained by linear interpolation between 1955 and 1965) and
the number of voters in 1957 while Model 6 divides the number of inquilinos in 1957
by the number of voters at time t. Using data on two additional pre-1958 election
years allows us to test whether the 1957 elections followed a pattern that was not
exceptional as it was also present in the two preceding elections. Similarly, after
1958, the change in electoral pattern highlighted for the 1965 elections should also
be present for the 1961 elections. We do not however necessarily expect the change
in 1961 to be as pronounced as in 1965 since the 1961 elections were closer to the
electoral reform and all political adjustments might not be instantaneous. Taking
the 1949 elections as a baseline, we therefore expect: 1949 > 0 and 1953 =
1957 = 0; and 0 > 1961  1965: The results are presented in Table 5 below.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
The results are very close to our former estimations. The coecients (and their
standard errors) associated with the 1957 and 1965 elections are almost identical
to those presented in Table 3. Again, Model 6, which is used as a robustness
check, provides less satisfactory results, and we will ignore them in the following
discussion.
As expected, the coecients associated with the 1961 election are smaller
(in absolute value) than the corresponding ones in 1965 but are systematically
negative and almost everywhere signicant. Moreover, there is no discernible
trend in the electoral pattern before the elections: the presence of inquilinos has
the same impact on the election outcomes in 1949, 1953 and 1957. This is all the
more remarkable given that the 1953 congressional and senatorial elections were
particular, with the rise of the populist party supporting Carlos Iba~nez and the
creation of a number of small parties at the expense of the traditional conservative
parties.30
30After the election to the presidency of Carlos Iba~nez in 1952, the 1953 elections saw a
transient collapse in the right-wing vote in the face of the Iba~nista bandwagon. Scully (1992,
p. 126) notes \The disruption of familiar patterns of party competition was also reected
in the extreme fragmentation by the party system in the congressional elections of 1953. In
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D. Christian Democratic votes
We ran similar regressions using the vote share of the Christian Democratic
party as the dependent variable. One can argue that, after the introduction
of the secret ballot, inquilinos are more likely to vote for that party than for
any other party. (We also ran similar regressions grouping the socialist and the
Christian Democratic parties together, with very similar results.) The focus on
the Christian Democratic party follows from the fact that, historically, peasants
constituted their political base, while the socialist party drew more support from
men and blue collar workers.
The estimates are given in table 6 below, where we followed the specication
used in the six models above. The results are once again supportive of our hy-
pothesis. While, before 1958, the communas with a higher proportion of inquilinos
tend to vote less in favor of the Christian Democratic party, this impact completely
disappears in 1965. The estimates are consistent across the various specications,
but sometimes not signicant, particularly when provincial dummies interacted
with time are used.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated how the employment relationship, if it
generates rents, may allow employers to control the political behavior of their
workers. The salient example of this is voting behavior when there is no secret
ballot, so that political behavior is observable. Interestingly, the rents conceded by
employers to workers gives the former a comparative advantage in controlling the
political activities of the latter, relative to political parties. We showed that this
helps to explain one of the big stylized facts about polities with endemic electoral
that year, 25 party organizations presented candidates, and 19 achieved representation. Party
proliferation weakened Chile's traditional parties. Whereas in the congressional elections of 1949
the Conservative, Liberal, and Radical parties combined received more than 60% of the vote,
in 1953 they received barely one third." This was just a temporary phenomena however. Scully
goes on to add (1992, p. 126) \Though Iba~nez had put the leadership of traditional parties on
the defensive in 1953, the situation was reversed between 1953 and 1957."
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corruption, namely that employers supply votes to parties rather than the parties
buying most votes separately from individuals. The ability to sell votes increases
the demand for labor and generates an added incentive to own land, driving up
its price.
We test some of the predictions of the model by examining in detail the eects
of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958. We show that, consis-
tent with our theory, the political reforms led to large changes in voting behavior.
Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tend
to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally asso-
ciated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform however, this dierence across
localities completely disappeared. In Baland and Robinson (2007) we show that
land prices in the same areas were signicantly higher prior to 1958 and then fell
afterwards.
These ndings suggest to us that electoral corruption, and the economic and
political incentives that it created, is an important part of the story for why
inequality has been so high historically in Latin America and possibly also an
important part of the story about why long-run economic performance in Latin
American has been so disappointing (on which see Engerman and Sokolo, 2005,
and Eduardo Posada-Carbo, 2000, who argue for the central importance of elec-
toral corruption in Latin American political history). Though our analysis focused
on vote buying, this can be thought of as a metaphor for a wide variety of political
favors or policies that transfer rents to the landlords. Moreover, the political con-
trol that rents allow employers to exercise applies much more generally, even in
situations where there is an eective secret ballot. Any type of observable politi-
cal activity, collective actions, demonstrations, trade unionism, political activism,
can all be controlled by the threat of losing one's employment and the rents that
it provides.
*Baland: CRED, Department of Economics, Facultes Universitaires Notre-
Dame de la Paix, 8 Rempart de la Vierge, B-5000 Namur, Belgium (e-mail:
jean-marie.baland@fundp.ac.be). Robinson: Department of Government, IQSS,
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Appendix Sources and methodology and description of variables used
`Agricultural workers' and `inquilinos' are the total number of agricultural
workers and the total number of inquilinos working in the agricultural sector in
1935, 1955 and 1964-5 respectively. Source:II Censo Nacional Agricola Ganadero,
1935, Vol. 1-6, Servicio Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Republica de Chile; III
Censo Nacional Agricola Ganadero, 1955, Vol. 1-6, Servicio Nacional de Estadis-
tica y Censos, Republica de Chile; IV Censo Nacional Agro-pecuario 1964-65, Vol.
1-26, Direccion de Estadistica y Censos, Republica de Chile. Population gures
came from the 1930, 1940, 1952, 1960 and 1970 Censo de Poblacion, Centro Lati-
namericano de Demograa. `Right-wing votes' is the proportion of votes in favor
of the `Conservador', `Conservador Tradicionalista' and `Liberal' parties in the
total number of valid votes, in the parliamentary elections of 1949, 1953, 1957,
1961, and 1965 respectively; `christian democrat' is the proportion of valid votes
in favor of the `Falangia Nacional', the 'Agrario Laboristas' and 'Partido Social
Christiano Conservador' in 1957 and the `Democrata Christiano' party for the
years 1961, 1965 and 1969. The `left' includes the proportion of valid votes in fa-
vor of the `Communista', `Socialista' and `Socialista Popular' parties in 1957, 1961
and 1965 respectively. The regrouping of the political parties was made according
to the methodology followed by Valenzuela (1978). The number of voters is the
number of valid votes in the 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961 and 1965 elections. We chose
parliamentary elections only because of their comparability across years and the
stability of the major parties over the years. Presidential and Municipal elections
in those years followed very closely the pattern followed by the parliamentary elec-
tions. Sources: Direccion del Registro Electoral, Election ordinaria de senadores
y diputados al Congreso Nacional (periodo constitucional1949-53, 1953-7), Chile;
Direccion del Registro Electoral, Variacion Porcentual de los Partidos Politicos,
1957-1971, Chile.
41
Figure 1: Right-wing votes and the ratio of inquilinos to registered voters in 1957 and 1965  
(scatter plot and simple regression line) 
 
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
R
i
g
h
t
 
W
i
n
g
 
v
o
t
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
5
7
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Proportion of Inquilinos in the population in 1957
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
R
i
g
h
t
 
W
i
n
g
 
v
o
t
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
6
5
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
Proportion of Inquilinos in the population in 1965
 
 
 Table 1: Agrarian relations, land concentration and electoral results in Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
Region 
Proportion 
of 
inquilinos 
in the 
population 
in 1935 
 
 
(percent) 
Proportion 
of 
inquilinos 
in the 
agricultural 
labour 
force in 
1955 
(percent) 
Proportion 
of 
inquilinos 
in the 
number of 
registered 
voters 
(1955-57) 
(percent) 
Proportion 
of right-
wing votes 
in 1957 
elections 
 
 
 
(percent) 
Proportion 
of right-
wing votes 
in 1965 
elections 
 
 
 
(percent) 
Proportion 
of 
christian-
democratic 
votes in the 
1957 
elections 
 
(percent) 
Proportion 
of 
christian-
democratic 
votes in the 
1965 
elections 
 
(percent) 
Share of 
total area 
operated by 
farms over 
200 has in 
1955 
 
 
(percent) 
North Central Valley 
(O’Higgins, Colchagua, 
Curico, Talca) 
4.8 19.6 18.9 50.0 17.3 4.8 40.8 75.7 
Urban Central Valley 
(Valparaiso, Santiago, 
Aconcagua) 
3.8 19.1 17.2 40.8 16.0 8.6 47.1 88.5 
South Central Valley 
(Maule, Linares, Nuble) 
4.5 12.7 14.6 40.5 17.2 4.9 39.0 60.1 
 
All Central Valley 
Provinces 
 
4.3 
 
17.4 
 
17.1 
 
44.4 
 
16.9 
 
6.0 
 
42.1 
 
74.9 
Frontier and Little North 
Provinces (Concepcion, 
Bio-bio, Arauco, Malleco, 
Cautin, Atacama, 
Coquimbo) 
3.2 10.8 11.2 31.2 11.8 7.4 33.7 68.9 
All other provinces 
(Valdivia, Osorno, 
Llanquihue, Chiloe, 
Aysen, Magallanes, 
Tarapaca, Antofagasta) 
3.0 5.7 8.2 26.6 15.1 14.7 29.6 69.4 
 
Chile (average across  all 
provinces) 
 
3.8 
 
11.8 
 
12.6 
 
35.0 
 
14.8 
 
8.7 
 
35.8 
 
 
71.4 
Note: For the Santiago province, we excluded the four exclusively urban districts of the city of Santiago.  
 
 Table 2: Impact of agrarian relations on right-wing votes before and after the 1958 electoral reform 
 
 1957 1965 Difference 65-57 
Ratio of inquilinos to 
the number of 
registered voters in 
1955 below median 
(<0.134) 
 
0.321 
 
0.159 
 
-0.162 
Ratio of inquilinos to 
the number of 
registered voters in 
1955 above median  
 
0.491 
 
0.188 
 
-0.303 
Difference  0.170 0.029 -0.141 
 
Table 3: Impact of inquilinos on right-wing votes in 1957 and 1965   
 
The dependent variable is the proportion of right-wing votes in the 1957 and 1965 parliamentary elections 
 Model 1 
inquilino/voter = inquilinos at time t/voters in 1957 
Model 2 
 inquilino/voter= inquilinos at 
time t/voters at time t 
Model 3 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos at 
time t/population at time t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Inquilino/voter 0.438** 
(0.173) 
0.259* 
(0.153) 
0.451*** 
(0.072) 
0.424*** 
(0.144) 
0.353** 
(0.124) 
3.533*** 
(1.306) 
2.095* 
(1.188) 
1965*Inquilino/voter 
 
-0.435*** 
(0.082) 
-0.294*** 
(0.090) 
-0.278*** 
(0.986) 
-0.369** 
(0.144) 
-0.203 
(0.136) 
-4.705*** 
(0.688) 
-3.034*** 
(0.801) 
Other agricultural 
workers/voter 
-0.102*** 
(0.031) 
-0.016 
(0.030) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
___ ___ -0.644*** 
(0.232) 
0.032 
(0.240) 
1965*Other agric. 
workers/voter  
0.047*** 
(0.012) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
___ ___ 0.364** 
(0.112) 
-0.076 
(0.141) 
Time dummy:1965 -0.197*** 
(0.019) 
-0.156*** 
(0.047) 
-0.157*** 
(0.056) 
-0.168*** 
(0.016) 
-0.141*** 
(0.048) 
-0.182*** 
(0.021) 
-0.121** 
(0.050) 
1965*Province ___ Yes Yes ___ Yes ___ Yes 
Other controls ___ Yes Yes ___ Yes ___ Yes 
Communa fixed effect Yes Yes No (pool. OLS) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Provincial dummies ___ ___ Yes ___ ___ ___ ___ 
Number of observ. 492 492 492 492 492 492 492 
Table 3 (ctd): Impact of inquilinos on right-wing votes in 1957 and 1965 
 
The dependent variable is the proportion of right-wing votes in the 1957 and 1965 parliamentary elections 
 Model 4 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 1935/population in 
1935 
Model 5 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 
1957/voters in 1957 
Model 6 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 
1957/voters at time t 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inquilino/voter 1.970*** 
(0.385) 
___ ___ ___ 0.448*** 
(0.072) 
0.734*** 
(0.200) 
0.592*** 
(0.185) 
1965*Inquilino/voter 
 
-1.561*** 
(0.515) 
-1.793*** 
(0.459) 
-1.357*** 
(0.440) 
-0.303*** 
(0.082) 
-0.304*** 
(0.098) 
-0.065 
(0.172) 
-0.022 
(0.172) 
Other agricultural 
workers/voter 
___ ___ ___ ___ -0.006 
(0.010) 
___ ___ 
1965*Other agric. 
workers/voter  
___ ___ ___ 0.003 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
___ ___ 
Time dummy:1965 -0.174*** 
(0.059) 
-0.167*** 
(0.021) 
-0.145*** 
(0.051) 
-0.158*** 
(0.046) 
-0.155*** 
(0.056) 
-0.168*** 
(0.016) 
-0.167*** 
(0.045) 
1965*Province Yes ___ Yes Yes Yes ___ Yes 
Other controls Yes ___ Yes Yes Yes ___ Yes 
Communa fixed effect No (pooled 
OLS) 
Yes Yes Yes No (pool. OLS) Yes Yes 
Provincial dummies Yes ___ ___ ___ Yes ___ ___ 
Number of observ. 422 422 422 492 492 492 492 
Note: Standard errors under brackets, ***indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. The additional 
controls for equations (2), (3), (7), (11) and (12) are the proportion of land under large farms and the population in the municipality; for equations (5), (8), (10) 
and (14), they also include the agricultural labour force.  For the fixed effect estimates, the within R-square ranged between 0.69 and 0.84, while the between R-
square ranged between 0.02 and 0.26. For equations (1), (8) and (12), the adjusted R2 were between 0.67 and 0.69. 
 
Table 4: Impact of inquilinos on right-wing votes in 1957 and 1965: alternative measures 
 
 
The dependent variable is the proportion of right-wing votes in the 1957 and 1965 parliamentary elections 
 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Inquilinos/total agricultural workers 1.063*** 
(0.260) 
0.425* 
(0.250) 
___ ___ 0.447* 
(0.251) 
1965*Inquilinos/total agricultural workers -1.023*** 
(0.210) 
-0.292 
(0.226) 
___ ___ -0.421* 
(0.260) 
Proportion of land under large farms ___ ___ 0.228* 
(0.120) 
0.046 
(0.105) 
0.034 
(0.104) 
1965*Proportion of land under large farms ___ ___ -0.181*** 
(0.051) 
0.010 
(0.051) 
0.059 
(0.059) 
Time dummy:1965 -0.112*** 
(0.021) 
-0.157*** 
(0.051) 
-0.097** 
(0.039) 
-0.203*** 
(0.061) 
-0.190*** 
(0.061) 
1965*Province ___ Yes ___ Yes Yes 
Other controls ___ Yes ___ Yes Yes 
Communa fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observ. 492 492 492 492 492 
Notes: Standard errors under brackets, ***indicates significance at the 1percent level, ** at the 5percent level and * at the 10percent level. The additional controls 
for equation (16) were the agricultural labour force, the proportion of land under large farms and the population; for equations (18) and (19), the agricultural 
labour force and the population. For the fixed effect estimates, the within R-square ranged between 0.65 and 0.84, while the between R-square ranged between 
0.02 and 0.24.  
Table 5: Impact of inquilinos on right-wing votes in 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961 and 1965 
 
 
The dependent variable is the proportion of right-wing votes in the 1949, 1953, 1957, 1961 and 1965 parliamentary elections 
 
 Model 4 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 1935/population in 
1935 
Alternative measure: 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 
1955/population in 1955 
Model 5  
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 
1957/voters in 1957 
Model 6 
inquilino/voter= inquilinos in 
1957/voters at time t 
 (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
Inquilino/voter 1.904*** 
(0.446) 
___ ___ 4.105*** 
(0.723) 
___ 0.488*** 
(0.081) 
___ 0.270*** 
(0.034) 
0.129*** 
(0.046) 
1953*Inquilino/voter 
 
-0.227 
(0.616) 
0.058 
(0.435) 
-0.059 
(0.449) 
0.725 
(1.000) 
0.215 
(0.733) 
0.118 
(0.113) 
0.090 
(0.082) 
0.085 
(0.063) 
0.037 
(0.050) 
1957*Inquilino/voter 
 
-0.003 
(0.614) 
0.031 
(0.435) 
0.323 
(0.453) 
0.099 
(1.001) 
0.619 
(0.733) 
-0.028 
(0.113) 
-0.004 
(0.082) 
0.165** 
(0.076) 
0.073 
(0.068) 
1961*Inquilino/voter 
 
-1.180* 
(0.615) 
-1.111** 
(0.435) 
-0.708 
(0.463) 
-1.579 
(1.001) 
-1.413* 
(0.734) 
-0.201* 
(0.114) 
-0.164* 
(0.083) 
0.149 
(0.098) 
0.011 
(0.098) 
1965*Inquilino/voter 
 
-1.589*** 
(0.617) 
-1.762*** 
(0.435) 
-1.007** 
(0.473) 
-2.614*** 
(1.002) 
-2.396*** 
(0.748) 
-0.330*** 
(0.114) 
-0.280*** 
(0.084) 
-0.007 
(0.129) 
-0.189 
(0.138) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year*province 
dummies 
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Communa fixed effect No (pooled 
OLS) 
Yes Yes No (pooled 
OLS) 
Yes No (pooled 
OLS) 
Yes No (pooled 
OLS) 
Yes 
YearDumy*Other 
agric. workers/voter 
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observ. 1034 1034 1034 1224 1224 1224 1224 1165 1165 
Notes: Standard errors under brackets, ***indicates significance at the 1percent level, ** at the 5percent level and * at the 10percent level. The within R-square 
ranged between 0.54 and 0.71, while the between R-square ranged between 0.13 nd 0.27. For equations (20), (23) and (25), the adjusted R2 were between 0.59 
and 0.61. The additional controls for equations (23)-(26) are the proportion of land under large farms and the population; for equations (20), (22), (27) and (28), 
they also include the agricultural labour force.  
 
Table 6: Impact of agrarian relations on votes for the Christian-Democratic parties 
 
 
The dependent variable is the proportion of votes for the Christian-Democratic parties in the 1957 and 1965 parliamentary elections 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
Inquilino/voter -0.268** 
(0.125) 
-0.123 
(0.101) 
-0.238** 
(0.104) 
-0.189** 
(0.083) 
-0.881 
(0.795) 
___ ___ -0.286** 
(0.125) 
1965*Inquilino/vo
ter 
0.403*** 
(0.059) 
0.224*** 
(0.060) 
0.356*** 
(0.104) 
0.089 
(0.091) 
1.927*** 
(0.536) 
0.514* 
(0.297) 
0.190*** 
(0.055) 
0.004 
(0.114) 
Other agricultural 
workers/voter 
0.016 
(0.023) 
-0.010 
(0.020) 
___ ___ -0.109 
(0.161) 
___ ___ ___ 
1965*Other agric. 
workers/voter  
-0.030*** 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.009) 
___ ___ -0.090 
(0.094) 
___ -0.142* 
(0.008) 
___ 
Time 
dummy:1965 
0.286*** 
(0.015) 
0.284*** 
(0.031) 
0.253*** 
(0.011) 
0.264*** 
(0.032) 
0.280*** 
(0.033) 
0.281*** 
(0.034) 
0.280*** 
(0.031) 
0.273*** 
(0.030) 
1965*Province 
 
___ Yes ___ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other controls 
 
___ Yes ___ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Communa fixed 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observ. 492 492 492 492 492 422 492 492 
Note: Standard errors under brackets, ***indicates significance at the 1percent level, ** at the 5percent level and * at the 10percent level. The within R-square 
ranged between 0.88 and 0.95, while the between R-square ranged between 0.01 and 0.11. The additional controls are as in Table 3.  
Table A1: Description of the main variables used 
 
Variable # obs. Mean Standard Dev. Minimum  Maximum  
Right-wing votes in 1949 246 0.481 0.215 0 0.953 
Right-wing votes in 1953 246 0.327 0.181 0 0.860 
Right-wing votes in 1957 246 0.407 0.195 0 0.914 
Right-wing votes in 1961 246 0.352 0.160 0 0.846 
Right-wing votes in 1965 246 0.174 0.111 0 0.577 
Christian-Democrat votes in 1957 246 0.069 0.144 0 0.736 
Christian-Democrat votes in 1965 246 0.371 0.111 0 0.629 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1957 to the 
number of registered voters in 1957 
246 0.165 0.144 0 0.832 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1965 to the 
number of registered voters in 1965 
246 0.083 0.084 0 0.449 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1957 in the 
agricultural labour force in 1957 
246 0.162 0.104 0 0.552 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1965 in the 
agricultural labour force in 1965 
246 0.088 0.059 0 0.327 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1935 in the 
population in 1935 
211 0.038 0.025 0 0.136 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1957 in the 
population in 1957 
246 0.021 0.017 0 0.068 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1965 in the 
population in 1965 
246 0.018 0.017 0 0.086 
Proportion of other agricultural 
workers in 1957 to the number of 
registered voters in 1957 
246 1.368 1.019 0.005 6.874 
Proportion of other agricultural 
workers in 1965 to the number of 
registered voters in 1965 
246 1.066 0.866 0.002 5.066 
Proportion of other agricultural 
workers in 1957 to the population in 
1957 
246 0.167 0.099 0.000 0.563 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1957 in the 
agricultural labour force in 1957 
246 0.117 0.065 0 0.298 
Proportion of inquilinos in 1965 in the 
agricultural labour force in 1965 
246 0.078 0.049 0 0.246 
Share of total area operated by farms 
over 200 hectares in 1957 
246 0.741 0.213 0 0.997 
Share of total area operated by farms 
over 200 hectares in 1965 
246 0.706 0.223 0 0.998 
Number of inquilinos in 1935 211 449 333 0 1770 
Number of inquilinos in 1955 246 305 290 0 1758 
Number of inquilinos in 1965 246 275 275 0 1669 
Number of other agricultural workers 
in 1955 
246 2008 1621 2 10338 
Number of other agricultural workers 
in 1965 
246 3063 2275 102 17934 
Population in 1930 216 14250 13722 1565 106025 
Population in 1940 215 17433 17433 614 215614 
Population in 1952 246 19406 25153 1255 223598 
Population in 1960 246 25026 36059 1092 259549 
Population in 1970 246 31338 49212 814 319767 
Number of votes in 1949 246 1404 2010 31 21397 
Number of votes in 1953 246 2418 3394 0 33594 
Number of votes in 1957 246 2876 4054 65 43599 
Number of votes in 1961 246 4299 5470 131 34901 
Number of votes in 1965 246 7248 11440 76 86664 
Note: Population, occupation and land concentration figures for 1957 were obtained by linear interpolation from the 1955 
and the 1965 agricultural censuses and the 1952, 1960 and 1970 population censuses. Population in 1935 was calculated by 
linear interpolation from the 1930 and 1940 population censuses. 
